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ABSTRACT 
Communication, navigation, surveillance, and decision 
support capabilities in Oceanic air traffic control are evolving 
significantly.  It is important to consider the effect of the 
changes on the controller’s task.  In this paper the results from 
multi-disciplinary studies performed at MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology)  and the University of Iceland are 
presented.  At MIT, a human-centered systems analysis was 
used to identify key human factors issues for the future 
Oceanic air traffic control environment to be experimentally 
investigated.  At the University of Iceland, a prototype for a 
future air traffic control display was designed and evaluated.  
Both studies identified three key human factors issues that 
require consideration.  The first is a mismatch between time 
and space separation restrictions imposed and information 
support provided, requiring the controller to cognitively 
resolve temporal/spatial mismatches to meet restrictions.  The 
second issue is the effects of mixed communication and 
surveillance equipage, which complicates the control task and 
requires the controller to cognitively integrate asynchronous 
information.   The final is the importance of cultivating 
controller trust and understanding issues of complacency and 
automation disuse when implementing highly automated 
conflict probes that are being considered in the future Oceanic 
environments.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Oceanic air traffic is growing; the FAA 2003 forecast predicts 
an annual growth rate of 4.2% for Oceanic passenger traffic 
and 6.3% for Oceanic cargo traffic for 2005-2014 [1].  The 
desire for increased fuel efficiencies encourages a reduction of 
separation minima and more efficient routing.  However, there 
is also a need to maintain the high level of safety present in 
the current Oceanic system.  These objectives are driving the 
integration of enhanced communication, navigation, and 
surveillance (CNS) technologies, causing the Oceanic air 
traffic control environment to evolve significantly over the 
next decade.  
The new era of Oceanic air transportation will significantly 
influence the tasks of the controller.  Therefore, during this 
time of transition human-centered issues need to be identified 
and addressed to guide the design of future Oceanic air 
transportation systems.  This approach would ensure 
reasonable controller workload while maximizing use of the 
capabilities afforded by human controllers. 
METHODS 
As part of a collaborative effort, research programs have been 
conducted in MIT’s Aeronautics and Astronautics Department 
and the University of Iceland’s Computer Science 
Department.  At MIT, issues for future systems have been 
identified through a top-down, human-centered systems 
analysis.  An initial controller cognitive model was created 
based on operating procedures and job task analyses [2,3].  
The cognitive model, shown in Figure 1, is partly based on 
work by Endsley and Pawlak [4,5].  Focused field studies at 
Reykjavik Center in Iceland, New York Center, Oakland 
Center and Shanwick Center in Scotland were conducted to 
refine the cognitive model and develop further analysis.  
During these field studies the cognitive model was used to 
guide the observations and interviews.  The information flow, 
shown in Figure 2 was developed and used as a basis for the 
human-centered systems analysis.  The next step is to perform 
a series of experiments to study these issues further.   
At the University of Iceland, the research focus was in the 
context of air traffic control at Reykjavik Center.  Standard 
HCI methods and analyses were applied for the development 
of a user interface, to be implemented in the near-term.  
Preliminary abstract Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
models were created and refined through site visits at 
Reykjavik Center [6].  Then a bottom-up analysis of the 
current user interface was developed in order to extract 
information from the user interfaces and identify 
discrepancies in use of concept.  Next a heuristic evaluation, 
based on Gerhardt-Powals’ Cognitive Engineering Principles, 
was used to identify errors in the current set of user interfaces 
[7].  Claims analysis, to discover positive and negative 
consequences of features or design issues, was then used to 
evaluate different approaches for a new interface [8].  Based 
on the results a new interface was prototyped.  User testing 
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Figure 1:  Controller cognitive model used to guide observations. 
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Figure 2:  Generalizeable information flow for Oceanic ATC facilities, developed from site visit results.
was conducted on this paper prototype to incorporate 
feedback from the Reykjavik controllers.  During the user 
testing the prototype was presented to six full performance 
controllers.  The controllers were asked questions about 
different aspects of the prototype, answers and comments 
were collected and used for further development of the 
prototype. For example, the controllers were asked whether 
conducting flight commanding on a spatial display would 
increase their performance and what they thought about the 
colors used in the display.  The next section explains the 
results from both of the studies and the following sections 
discuss the issues further.  Based on the research studies at 
MIT and the University of Iceland, three common issues for 
future Oceanic air traffic control systems have emerged; 
cognitive projection, mixed and variable equipage, and trust in 
future technologies. 
RESULTS  
Current Oceanic Control 
Currently the primary means of communication between pilot 
and controller is High Frequency (HF) radio through a 
communication relay service, illustrated in the information 
flow in Figure 2.  This communication loop was observed to 
be approximately three to five minutes, depending on the 
workload of the controller, radio operator, and pilot.  Since  
 Figure 3:  Eastbound North Atlantic tracks for November 25, 
2003 provide procedural structure to the airspace to reduce the 
controller complexity. 
most Oceanic traffic is out of radar coverage, surveillance is 
conducted through position reports, communicated by the 
pilot to the controller approximately every hour.   
Most of the North Atlantic and part of the Pacific traffic 
follows the Oceanic Track Structure.  The tracks are 
negotiated by the Centers daily based on wind information 
and forecast traffic.  An example of one day’s eastbound 
tracks across the North Atlantic is shown in Figure 3.  This 
airspace structure, which reduces the continuous 4-D traffic 
problem to a longitudinal time-based sequencing task, is a 
manifestation of the surveillance limits of the current system.  
The current Oceanic workstations at Oakland Center, New 
York Center (North Atlantic only), and Reykjavik Center 
consist of flight strips and a spatial situation display, examples 
are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.  The primary 
difference between the U.S. and Reykjavik Centers is the 
medium of the flight strips.  At Oakland and New York 
Center paper flight strips are still used.  Reykjavik Center 
transitioned to electronic flight strips in April 2002, which 
removed the administrative task of manually updating each 
flight strip as changes are made.  Electronic flight strips also 
enable information from the strips to be displayed on the 
situation display.  Shanwick Center controllers rely on 
electronic flight strip information alone.  
The structural basis for the controller cognitive representation 
of the traffic situation is apparent in the flight strip  
 
Figure 4: At this U.S. Oceanic workstation (implemented in 
Oakland and New York Centers), the controller is comparing 
paper flight strips with the sector map.  The spatial situation 
display (right) is also available for confirming that separation 
standards are met. 
 
Figure 5:  The Reykjavik controller workstation consists of 
electronic flight strips, in front of the controller and a situation 
display, to the left of the controller. 
organization, which varies between the facilities.  Shanwick 
and Reykjavik Centers’ strips are organized by altitude 
groupings, as shown in Figure 6.  Within these groupings 
strips are arranged by time, with the first flight to leave the 
sector on the bottom.  Horizontally, each strip shows the 
longitudinal progress through the airspace at the discrete 
position reporting points.  The strips are copied to the affected 
altitude groupings when a flight makes a vertical maneuver.  
In contrast, New York Center and Oakland Center group 
aircraft into columns by longitudinal waypoints and other 
points where complex interactions take place.  In each of these 
columns there is a copy of the strip for each aircraft that 
passes through this point according to the approved flightplan 
as illustrated in Figure 7.  Vertically, the strips are arranged 
first by time and then by altitude.   
A
lti
tu
de
Longitude  
Figure 6: Electronic flight strips used at Reykjavik Center are 
organized into a position matrix.  Vertically they are grouped by 
altitude and horizontally the longitudinal waypoint information 
is given. 
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Figure 7:  Paper flight strips at New York Center are organized 
vertically first by time and then by altitude.  Horizontally there is 
a copy of each strip in each longitudinal position it passes 
through. 
In all of the Oceanic facilities visited, the controllers are 
required, by procedure, to ensure separation using the flight 
strips.  Consequently the controllers’ mental model is trained 
to view the traffic situation as it is portrayed on the strips.  
The flight strip information and thus the controller mental 
model has evolved to support the controllers’ task of 
longitudinally sequencing aircraft along the flight tracks.  The 
primary separation requirements used in this task are temporal 
minute-in-trail requirements, such as 10 minutes longitudinal 
separation.  The flight strips, providing temporal information 
on the arrival of the flight at a particular longitudinal position, 
are an appropriate form of support for the temporal 
sequencing task. 
The spatial situation display is a graphical depiction of the 
continuous projected path of aircraft based on the initial flight 
plan, updates to the flight plan and models influencing aircraft 
trajectories, such as the wind model.  It serves only as a 
secondary tool for Oceanic controllers.  Since the information 
on the situation display is not reliably updated, the controllers 
often do not trust or use the spatial situation display.  
However, there are situations in which a spatial separation 
requirement must be met using temporal flight strip 
information in the current Oceanic environment, such as the 
lateral separation between the tracks and crossing traffic.  In 
this situation at New York and Oakland Centers, the 
controllers manually transcribe the flight strip information 
onto an erasable map to determine if the spatial requirement 
can be met.   
This is frequently seen in Oakland airspace because RNP-10 
(Required Navigation Performance) has been implemented for 
most Pacific routes.  The RNP index is a measure of aircraft 
navigational performance.  RNP-X requires that all aircraft in 
the designated airspace maintain a navigational cross-track 
performance accuracy of X nautical miles (nm), 95 percent of 
the time.  Lateral separation for RNP-10 aircraft in the Pacific 
has been reduced from 100 nm to 50 nm.  Usually the track 
structure provides lateral separation, however in this airspace 
the tracks are separated by 50 nm, which is appropriate only 
for RNP-10 equipped aircraft.  Therefore if an aircraft that is 
not RNP-10 certified crosses through this airspace the 
controller must manually ensure 100 nm lateral separation 
between the unequipped aircraft and the tracks using the 
erasable map.  The controllers reported that this increases 
their workload and decreases the number of pilot requests 
they are able to address.   
In addition to improved navigation performance, improved 
surveillance (e.g., Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)) 
and communication are being introduced.  The frequency of 
future surveillance updates and communication paths will 
significantly increase, as shown in Figure 8.  These 
improvements provide the opportunity for Oceanic ATC 
initiatives such as reduced separation.  As a near-term step the 
programs for Reduced Vertical Separation Minima1 (RVSM) 
have been implemented in the North Atlantic and the Pacific 
and Reduced Horizontal Separation Minima (RHSM) for 
RNP-10 certified aircraft is active in the Pacific, as mentioned 
above.  In the far-term the FAA plans to move towards 
“Oceanic Free Flight”.  This concept is still being defined, but 
it generally entails a certain level of free routing by aircraft 
across the oceans and a degree of self-separation by aircraft 
[9].   
In order to achieve the operational benefits of these initiatives 
aircraft must meet CNS equipage requirements.  However, the 
high cost to meet aircraft equipment requirements introduces a 
barrier to entry and not all aircraft will initially choose to 
levels of equipage performance introduces new operational 
factors.  The controller must now be aware of the aircraft 
equipage and determine which procedures to apply based on 
this new attribute.   
One approach, which is currently used to simplify the mixed 
equipage airspace for the controller, is to segregate airspace 
for equipped and unequipped aircraft.  For example since 
most aircraft that fly over the ocean are RVSM certified, flight 
levels 290-410, which includes the most preferred airspace, 
are reserved for RVSM equipped aircraft. Aircraft that are not 
equipped for RVSM are restricted to the airspace below or 
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Figure 8:  Controller and pilot surveillance and communication 
paths in the current and future environment.  Surveillance and 
communication frequency will drastically increase in the future 
environment. 
                                                          
1 For RVSM, vertical separation is reduced from 2000 ft. to 
1000 ft. 
above these flight levels.  Currently aircraft equipage 
information is displayed on the flight strip in the United States 
and Iceland as a letter designator.  In an environment with 
more complex variations in aircraft equipage this current 
method will not allow the controller to handle the interactions 
of aircraft with different levels of equipage.   
The increase in complexity due to the mixed equipage 
environment is expected to lead to controllers to simplify the 
control task by applying the procedures appropriate to the 
lowest level of equipage to all aircraft, i.e. the lowest common 
denominator.  Therefore, the advantage of these initiatives 
would not be achieved unless the ATC systems adapt to the 
future environment.  For example, Reykjavik Center mixed 
radar and Oceanic workstations are not equipped to integrate 
radar and pilot position report information.  One spatial 
display shows the aircraft in radar coverage only and another 
shows the extrapolation of all the aircraft paths within the 
sector based on the flight strip information.  The controller 
must cognitively integrate the information from the two 
spatial displays, as well as the flight strips.   
Reykjavik Prototype 
The design of a future Reykjavik workstation is being 
investigated by the University of Iceland.  The prototype 
design, illustrated in Figure 9, is a spatial display without 
flight strips.  The controllers were presented with three 
approaches for a user interface, before they were shown the 
new prototype.  The three approaches were: 1) flight strips 
only, 2) a spatial situation display only, and 3) a display with 
synchronization between the flight strips and the spatial 
situation display.  They were asked to choose which approach 
they preferred.  The majority (four out of six) of the 
controllers chose the spatial situation display only.  The 
controllers preferred having all the information they need on 
an intuitive display.  However, they expressed concerns about 
losing key elements that the strips provide.  Specifically, they 
reported that the time sequence information and the altitude 
groupings of the flight strips are important to performing their 
control tasks.  This is an apparent indication of the impact that 
the flight strip structure has on the controller mental model.   
Another attribute of the prototype is the integration of 
different surveillance sources.  In the prototype, the 
surveillance sources are all integrated into one display and 
distinguished by using different aircraft icons, as shown in 
Figure 10.  During user testing of this prototype the 
controllers reported that they did not feel that they would be 
able to distinguish between the symbols for the different 
surveillance sources (small diamonds and circles).  This is 
being addressed in the second phase of prototyping.   
The user testing of the University of Iceland’s prototype in 
Reykjavik also raised trust issues.  The controllers were asked 
to rank their trust in the prototype on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 
meaning “Yes, very much so” and 5 meaning “Not at all”.  
The response was 2.75 on average.  It is hypothesized that 
controllers do not have trust in the current workstation 
because of data input quality and inadequate failure modes, 
which impacted their trust in this prototype. 
 
Figure 9:  The University of Iceland prototype is a spatial 
display.  The current research studies are addressing whether the 
controller mental model can adapt to a spatial model. 
 
Figure 10:  Aircraft icons from the University of Iceland 
prototype show secondary radar data (right) and secondary data 
reinforced with primary radar data (left). 
US Prototype 
The Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures 
(ATOP), shown in Figure 11, is the future U.S. workstation.  
Implementation is planned at New York Center, Oakland 
Center, and Anchorage Center in 2004.  It consists of 
electronic flight strips and a situation display.   In this 
workstation, the spatial display will be used as the primary 
means of separation. All available radar information, ADS-A, 
and position report information will be integrated and 
displayed on the situation display.  The new system will also 
provide the controller with more decision support tools for 
identifying and resolving conflicts.  Since this is the first 
transition into a significantly different Oceanic environment in  
 
Figure 11:  Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures 
(ATOP) is the future Oceanic workstation for the United States.  
Implementation at Oakland, Anchorage, and New York Center 
will begin in year 2004. 
the U.S., it is a critical time for evaluating each of the three 
issues identified. 
DISCUSSION 
Space and Time Projection  
Across the four facilities observed, there is a plan to move 
towards the use of spatial situation displays as the primary 
means of safe separation.  As the Oceanic facilities proceed 
towards this spatial representation of the surveillance 
information, it is possible that controllers will be required to 
alter the method in which they are projecting the traffic 
situation.   
In most of the observed Oceanic environments, a mixed 
spatial/temporal surveillance exists.  Since most of the 
separation restrictions are based on time, a cognitive 
transformation is required between the spatial surveillance 
information and the projection required to determine predicted 
separation.  The transform may change the spatial surveillance 
information received into temporal information, resolving the 
projection into comparable terms with the temporal restriction.  
Another option would be to change the temporal restriction to 
a spatial restriction, and then compare the spatial projection 
with the spatial restriction.  
Consistent with this notion, it was observed that when spatial 
restrictions were provided, controllers transferred temporal 
information from flight strips onto a spatial map to determine 
if constraints were met.   This observation is consistent with 
the concept that the temporal surveillance information was 
transformed into spatial format to be projected and compared 
against spatial separation restrictions. 
When deciding whether to replace the flight strips with 
another means of primary surveillance, it is important to 
consider the effect of the changing surveillance on the 
cognitive method of aircraft separation and sequencing used 
by the controllers as well as the value that the flight strips add.   
Further studies into how controller’s cognitive projections can 
be supported in future ATC systems in Oceanic and domestic 
environments are ongoing at MIT. The University of Iceland 
also plans to incorporate the key flight strip elements into the 
spatial situation display of their prototype.    
Mixed and Variable Equipage 
As improved CNS equipment capabilities are introduced into 
the Oceanic environment the problem of mixed and variable 
equipage will become more significant and must be 
considered for future systems and procedures.  In particular, 
airspace segregation strategies and controller display support 
should be considered.   
There are four degrees of freedom about which airspace can 
be segregated: vertical, lateral, longitudinal, and time.  
Currently airspace is segregated for RVSM aircraft along the 
vertical axis, allowing only equipped aircraft between flight 
levels 290 and 410.  Lateral segregation could come in the 
form of designating tracks or airways to aircraft with certain 
performance levels.  Airspace can also be segregated by 
designating lateral and longitudinal maneuvering zones, in 
which a higher level of performance would be required.  An 
analogy to this type of segregation was observed at Reykjavik 
Center.  Some Oceanic traffic crosses through areas covered 
by Iceland and Greenland radar.  The separation minima 
within the radar coverage is reduced from 60 nm to 5 nm.  It 
was observed that the controllers manage most of the crossing 
and climbing traffic during the radar coverage because of the 
increased flexibility. 
Controller display support can also alleviate some of the 
issues associated with mixed equipage.  At a minimum the 
display of aircraft equipage information needs to be improved 
upon because the current letter designator on the flight strips 
is not sufficient for the expected range of future equipment 
levels.  Also, current equipage information does not provide 
for the display of non-nominal situations such as satellite 
outages or equipment failures.  Therefore a transparent, 
dynamic equipage indicator that is standardized across the 
facilities is needed.      
Trust 
The trend for the future Oceanic ATC environment is to 
incorporate more automation aids for the controller to mitigate 
the effects of increasing operational complexity.   When 
providing experts with decision support it is critical to ensure 
that the new systems are reliable and should therefore be 
trusted.  Once that is complete a balance between misuse, 
defined by Parasuraman as “overreliance on automation” and 
disuse, defined as “underutilization of automation” must be 
attained for successful transition [10].  This can only be 
accomplished through appropriate controller trust in the 
automation aid.   
During the field studies, certain aspects of the systems were 
observed to be unreliable, due primarily to data input quality 
and failure modes.  The accuracy of the spatial situation 
display at New York and Oakland Centers is based on the 
quality of the input data.  Data is integrated from cockpit 
datalink messages, the communication relay service electronic 
messages and manual controller input of verbal 
communications.  Several mistypes received from the 
electronic messages were observed during the field studies 
and the controllers reported that these types of errors occur 
frequently.   When controller workload is high they do not 
have time to resolve these discrepancies or type in updated 
information received through verbal communication.  
Therefore, the conflict alerts that appear on the situation 
display do not usually represent real conflicts and are often 
disregarded by the controllers.  This inappropriate detection of 
conflicts by the automation is one of the four general 
constructs critical to developing trust identified by Dzindolet 
[11].   
Procedures for system failures also affect controller trust.  At 
Reykjavik Center the procedures call for the use of paper 
flight strips in the case of a shut-down.  However, the paper 
flight strip system does not allow the air traffic controllers to 
accept the increased throughput enabled by the automation.  
This is particularly important because it is difficult to decrease 
the traffic load.  The inefficiency of the shut-down procedures 
restricted Reykjavik Center from increasing the number of 
aircraft each controller could handle at one time.   
Another trust factor is the controllers highly trained mental 
model, which directly matches the current means of control.  
If future systems do not match this mental model the 
controllers will interpret the discrepancies either as the 
inadequacy of the automation logic or they will lose 
confidence in their ability to perform.  This issue of self 
confidence was identified in the Dzindolet’s experiment as a 
critical element to developing appropriate trust in decision 
support [11].  If the controllers lose confidence in self, they 
will rely on the automation completely, which would be a 
misuse.  If the controllers question the performance of the 
automation aid, they will not use the new system at all, which 
would be a waste of resources and the alerts would become a 
nuisance to the controllers.  Solutions for addressing the trust 
issue are difficult and highly dependent on the context.   
CONCLUSIONS 
As the Oceanic ATC environment enters into a new era of 
control with the introduction of technologies such as satellites 
and conflict probes, key human-centered systems issues need 
to be addressed during the transition period.  In this paper 
three key issues have been identified and explored through 
independent studies at MIT and the University of Iceland.  
These fundamental issues are critical to successful transition.  
The mismatch between the controller mental model and the 
information given to him/her will lead to poor performance 
and controller dissatisfaction if not addressed.  At the very 
least, it is imperative that support for the temporal sequencing 
task is provided as well as support for the spatial separation 
task.  If the mixed equipage environment is not adequately 
addressed, controller workload will increase and equipped 
aircraft will not receive the full benefits of equipping.  This 
will produce a stalemate in the evolution of the system.  
Controller trust is vital to the acceptance and proper use of the 
automation aids scheduled for implementation.   
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